

Classification changed to
RESTRICTED

by authority of AOC, S, G-2, WDGS

by

E. S. JOHNSTON
Colonel, Infantry
CUSTODIAN

5 JAN 1945

UNCLASSIFIED

N-6231

8-1177

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Intelligence Lessons from NORTH AFRICA

OPERATION "TORCH"

Up to 1st March 1943

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
A. I (a) (Operation Intelligence)	1
B. Photographic Intelligence and Air Liaison	3
C. Signals Intelligence	7
D. Security (Counter Intelligence)	9
E. Censorship, Public Relations & Propaganda	13
F. Clerical Work at A.F.H.Q.	15

UNCLASSIFIED

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 1943		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Intelligence lessons from North Africa, Operation TORCH				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 20310				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT Intelligence lessons learned from Operation Torch during the campaign for North Africa. Report includes operation intelligence, photographic intelligence and air liaison, signals intelligence, counter intelligence, and censorship, public relations, and propaganda.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 20	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

UNCLASSIFIED

17 March 1943.

Intelligence Lessons from North Africa

Operation "TORCH"

Up to 1st March 1943

A. I (a).

1. Information Generally.

a. The information produced in London for the planning of the "TORCH" operation was both full and accurate.

b. I.S.I.S. Publications.

For the British forces taking part in the expedition, these publications were issued down to battalion headquarters, whereas in American Task Forces they were only issued down to headquarters of Regimental Combat Teams (Brigade H.Q.). It is recommended that in future issue should only be made down to Brigade level. For battalions and equivalent units an abridged form should be issued, prepared either centrally in London or by Division and Brigade Headquarters.

c. I.S.(O) Notes.

These were issued down to Brigade and R.C.T. Headquarters. This distribution appeared adequate. It is important, however, that I.S.I.S. publications and I.S.(O) notes should always have the same distribution, as the two are supplementary. Last minute intelligence can then be supplied to formations and units by the issue of amendments to I.S.(O) notes and these amendments can cover subjects also included in the I.S.I.S. publications.

d. Intelligence officers responsible for supplying intelligence for planning staff should be allowed personal access to the main sources of intelligence, i.e. in London the War Office, and in Algiers, Allied Force Headquarters. Applying for intelligence through an intermediary such as I.S.(O) is not sufficient, however desirable it may be from other points of view; on occasions personal discussion with the intelligence experts at the fountain head must be permitted, provided that security is not endangered.

e. First Army prepared a booklet on North Africa, the country, inhabitants and customs for issue to troops on board ship. This was found to be most valuable, and similar booklets should be prepared for future operations.

f. Revision of I.S.I.S. Publications.

It is important that as soon as possible after the occupation of a country, the information contained in I.S.I.S. publications should be checked and added to. It has been found in practice that with active operations in progress and future planning being done, there is no intelligence personnel available to undertake the large amount of work involved. In theory, units and formations not engaged in active operations should be able to do the work in their own areas. In practice, this is unlikely to be satisfactory owing to training and other activities.

It is, therefore, recommended either that officers from I.S.T.D., or a section of officers trained in topographical work should be sent into the theater soon after occupation has taken place.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
g. Transmission of Information.

It has been evident that information is very slow in coming back when ordinary channels of communication are used. It has been found in this theater that reports take up to twelve hours or more to reach Allied Force Headquarters when transmitted through normal signal channels.

The Commander in Chief is anxious, and entitled to receive the latest information, and it is therefore recommended for consideration that there should be some form of liaison organization to collect urgent information, both about our own troops and the enemy, from the headquarters of Corps and above, and transmit it to the headquarters of higher formations over special wireless links. This would ensure that vital information got back quickly. Detailed information would continue to be forwarded in the normal manner.

2. Topographical Intelligence.

It is recommended that one I.O. at the headquarters of an Army should be specially trained in topographic appreciations and the preparation of "going" maps, etc.

3. Liaison Officers.

If, as in the case of North Africa, there is expectation that the Army of the country occupied will join the British and fight with them, it is very necessary that all formations should have with them carefully selected liaison officers who speak the language fluently. In Allied Force Headquarters we had three officers, two of whom went forward at once to join the French forces fighting under independent command in Tunisia. At a time when the attitude of the French was uncertain, these officers not only sent back valuable reports on operations and on the state of training and morale of the French, but also gave the French a feeling of confidence and a knowledge of the strength and intention of the Allies.

4. Interrogation.

a. P.W.I.S. should be self contained as regards transport and this should be landed as early as possible.

b. Interrogators attached to formations are at present only capable of interrogating in German. It is considered that at least a proportion of all Corps and Divisional interrogators should be capable of interrogating in Italian.

c. In many cases, prisoners have not been segregated properly after capture, and have been given cigarettes and tea before interrogation.

5. Captured Material.

The problem of getting back captured material is a difficult one as fighting units do not have the technical ability to decide what should be sent back, and are usually too busy to make the necessary arrangements. In Tunisia, the situation is further complicated as most captured equipment is at once handed over to the French to make up shortages.

The War Department is shortly sending out a team of ordnance personnel trained in the examination of enemy material, to work under the Intelligence Branch at Allied Force Headquarters. It is proposed to have a portion of this team well forward, to be sent to any part of the line where active operations are taking place. They will be responsible for discovering what material has been captured and for ensuring that it is evacuated to the rear as early as possible. The remainder of the team will be at Allied Force Headquarters under the Technical Intelligence officer to arrange for photographs, measurements and despatch to U.K. or U.S.

It is recommended that similar teams be organized in future for British expeditions with transport including at least one 30 cwt. truck for the removal of material.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

6. Interpreters.

Apart from interpreters forming part of the Lines of Communication, no personnel to carry out these duties was attached to the Headquarters of formations. This did not matter much in North Africa as many officers and a number of men spoke French. But there will be a definite need when the country is German or Italian. Unless interpreters are provided, the intent is to employ officers from the Intelligence Staff, Interrogators or Field Security personnel to the exclusion of their proper duties.

It is therefore recommended that in each headquarters of a division or above there should be at least one interpreter, not necessarily under the Intelligence Branch. He should be of sufficient status to be able to conduct negotiations or to interpret for the Commander. He should be provided with an interpreter clerk who can do translations.

At G.H.Q. a larger section will probably be necessary, and this might well form part of the Civil Affairs Branch.

7. Draughtsmen's Equipment.

Owing to the necessity of splitting Army and Corps H.Q., the draughtsmen attached to each H.Q. have inadequate equipment.

It is considered that each draughtsman should have the following equipment:

One box (Intelligence box type, strengthened) large enough to take the following:

- Metre straight edge
- Complete set of UNO stencils
- Complete set of draughtsmen's instruments
- Complete set of inks
- Clips to take pencils
- At least 12 Gillot's nibs and 4 holders.

B. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE AND AIR LIAISON.

8. Photographic material provided for Operation "TORCH" consisted of the following principal items:

- a. Vertical stereoscopic cover.
- b. Interpretation Reports illustrated by annotated Rota-mosaics.
- c. Photo mosaics, some annotated.
- d. Photo-map substitutes.
- e. Models and views of models.
- f. Special Interpretation Reports.

It is proposed to consider each of the above, any lessons deduced from their use in Operation "TORCH" and recommendations for future planning.

9. Vertical Stereoscopic Cover.

a. Extent: Chiefly a narrow strip along the coast and isolated critical areas inland. A great deal of this cover was made before the planning stage and was invaluable for comparative purposes. Subsequent cover required to observe alterations in enemy defences was made by a small number of Mosquito missions from Gibraltar.

b. A wide distribution was made of vertical cover, for the use of which many of the recipients were untrained.

UNCLASSIFIED

c. Conclusions.

UNCLASSIFIED

(1) During the early planning stage extensive coverage is essential, both for intelligence and as a basis for later comparison.

(2) Vertical cover should not be distributed below Brigade H.Q. (except in special cases). Staff officers not trained in the use of aerial photographs would be best served by over printed maps and annotated photo-mosaics.

10. Interpretation Reports and Rota Mosaics.

The interpretation reports produced for TORCH included details of beach topography, exits from beaches, beach and other military defences, wireless stations, incl. R.D.F., harbour boom defences and principal civil and municipal installations, etc. They were illustrated by lithographed mosaics suitably annotated. These were given a wide distribution. The chief complaint was that the lithographs were in many cases of indifferent quality and a great deal of photographic detail was lost.

Conclusions. There is no difficulty in effecting a wide distribution of Interpretation Reports, but it is felt that the report could be adequately illustrated by annotated maps (say 1/25,000 and 1/50,000) and by annotated photo-mosaics of selected areas of first importance.

11. Photo-mosaics.

These were not widely used for TORCH, their place being taken by lithographs. It is considered that they should be more widely used in future planning, with a distribution down to include Brigades. A scale of 1/15,000 should be adequate.

12. Photo-map substitutes.

750,000 sheets of photo map substitutes were provided, the basis being the Rota-print mosaics used to illustrate the interpretation reports (see para. 10 above). An arbitrary one inch grid was over-printed, also North point, etc. The disadvantages of this photo-map substitute were:

- a. Much detail was lost in the printing.
- b. It was an uncontrolled mosaic and useless to the artillery.
- c. The same grid reference could be given on every sheet and might have caused serious confusion.
- d. The grid had no connection with the line map grid; hence another possible source of confusion.
- e. There was no indication of contours on the map, which was thus deprived of a great deal of tactical value.

Conclusions.

It is apparent there is a great advantage in an over-printed map over an annotated lithographic mosaic, in that:

- a. The same map and the same grid will be in universal use amongst ground troops.
- b. The annotations of enemy defences appear in correct relationship to the topographical representation, i.e., contours, etc.
- c. Production will be quicker as the over-printed map can be produced independent of mosaic laying.
- d. The amount of material to be issued to units and sub-units will be reduced, i.e., a map instead of a map and a lithographed map substitute.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

13. Models.

UNCLASSIFIED

The basis of the issue of models was that for each assault landing and parachute landing a model should be provided. It is considered that the models were of inestimable value. The scale used for beach assault and parachute landing models was either 1/2,000 (vertical and horizontal) or 1/5,000 (vertical and horizontal). Of these two scales the former is better, but where time is short a scale of 1/5,000 is perfectly adequate. Most recipients of models are agreed that some detail could have been omitted, particularly in modelling densely built-up areas, without prejudice to the value of the model. In addition to large scale models, certain areas were modelled at small scale for use on aircraft carriers engaged in ground bombardment. These do not take long to produce as only topographical detail requires to be modelled. Other detail is best shown by painting it diagrammatically on the model.

Conclusions. A model should be provided for each assault and parachute landing, whenever possible. Normally a scale of 1/5,000 should suffice and unnecessary detail should be cut out to save time in production. Small scale models for use on aircraft carriers are not essential but can be provided if other work permits.

14. Views of Models.

These were divided into three main types:

a. Vertical views: These were provided only of aerodrome models, for parachutists, and of harbour models for special assaults. They were produced either under daylight or night conditions, or both. These are of considerable value.

b. Oblique views: Taken from any direction and simulated height, either under day or night conditions, as required by the demander. These were provided for beaches, ports and aerodromes models. They are extremely useful for the assaulting infantry, parachutists, and the pilot and navigator of troop-carrying aircraft.

c. Sea level views: Taken from any angle and at any simulated distance off shore, either under day or night conditions, as required by the demander. These have one main disadvantage, i.e., the skyline of the model as it appears on the photo is not necessarily the true skyline as it would appear on the ground itself. This condition arises when there is higher ground in the hinterland, which, for reasons of space, cannot be included in the area modelled.

Conclusions. All the above views are valuable and should be produced. As regards sea level views, some indication should be given as to whether the sea level view shows a true or false skyline.

15. Special Interpretation Reports.

These were produced as required and covered special aspects not included in the routine reports, such as:

a. Parachutist dropping areas.

b. Going reports and special topographical details.

c. Special road and bridges reports.

d. Any other details arising out of planners' specific questions.

These were given a distribution as indicated by the requester. During the later stages of planning at Norfolk House an interpreter worked in the H.Q. to answer "spot" questions as they occurred. This is most useful and a great time saver.

UNCLASSIFIED

16. General.

UNCLASSIFIED

a. During planning for "TORCH" it was observed that there was considerable disparity between the numbers of copies of photographic material requested by one formation and those requested by a second similar formation. This apparently depended on the varying amount of knowledge shown in the Intelligence Sections in photographic intelligence. It is suggested that a scale of issue be drawn up and submitted to all concerned as a guide.

b. The use of Vectograph, whereby stereoscopic photos can be projected on a screen and viewed by an audience, should be considered as a useful aid in the briefing of commandos, parachutists and other assault troops.

17. P.R.U. in North Africa.

There has been a very great shortage of aircraft capable of taking air photographs to fulfil army requirements. This has been due to the fact that:

a. There were not sufficient aircraft in P.R.U. flight originally allotted for this theater of operations.

b. That neither A.C. Squadron allotted to 5th Corps or 6th Armd. Div. was capable of taking photos.

It is considered that at least 4 aircraft of each squadron attached to Corps or Armd. Div. should be equipped with cameras capable of taking both vertical and oblique photographs.

18. Photographic Interpreters.

The value of experienced photo interpreters has been greatly emphasized by experiences gained during "TORCH" and subsequently.

The following suggestions are made:

a. The A.P.I.S. allotted to an army must be made fully mobile and capable of working in office vehicles when no permanent accommodation is available. It should be a self contained unit. It must work in close liaison with Survey, in connection with production of over-printed battle maps, and with R.A., in the locating and reporting of hostile batteries. In this latter connection a C.B. liaison officer with A.P.I.S. is of great value.

b. The I.O. Photos at Corps H.Q. should not be employed on other intelligence tasks, as has happened. He has an important function in cross-checking ground information with photographic intelligence and re-examining air photographs in the light of information from other sources. It is considered that a great amount of useful work of this sort could be carried out at Division H.Q. if an interpreter were available there, as is the case in M.E. The time saved by this cross check below the level of Army H.Q. is most important. Subsequent detailed checking must be done at A.P.I.S. The importance of A.P.I.S. receiving all intelligence which can be checked from photos, is stressed.

c. The Photo vehicles comprising what is known as the "Blue Train" are far too big and unwieldy. A singular lack of imagination has been shown in their design and their movement by road is a considerable traffic control problem.

d. In the planning of a similar operation, provision must be made for an adequate team of military and RAF interpreters to deal with strategical photo intelligence for Army, Navy and Air Force. Those provided for TORCH were inadequate in numbers and lacking in draughtsmen, clerks and technical photo personnel, with a consequent severe limitation on their efficient working. In spite of such limitations the personnel available did excellent work, but were only preserved from complete exhaustion by frequent periods of bad flying weather.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

The number of photo interpretation personnel to be provided varies directly with the number of photo reconnaissance aircraft available, and it is this latter figure which must be used as a basis for calculation.

19. Air Liaison Officers.

There has been a shortage of trained A.L.Os. in the theater of operations. Each squadron attached to Corps or Armd Div has one A. L. Section and in addition First Army has two A. L. Sections.

It is considered that at least one A. L. O. is required for each aerodrome from which aircraft may operate in support of ground operations, whether such support takes the form of Close Support, Tac/R or Photo/R.

C. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (Y).

20. Any review of the lessons learnt in this campaign in the functioning of Signals Intelligence (British: Wireless Intelligence, generally known as Y) can be divided into three parts:

- a. Before landing,
- b. After landing and
- c. General.

It is proposed to consider the subject under these three heads.

21. Before Landing.

The outstanding lesson learnt was the need for despatching complete units in the first follow up and not dividing them into roughly two halves between convoys 2 and 3. This precaution had been taken to avoid the risk of the total loss of the unit, but it is now seen that by dividing the unit or units among several ships of the same convoy the same insurance against total loss is achieved. The advantages are that in the early stages of any campaign the maximum amount of Y cover is necessary as no other day to day source of intelligence exists, and also that the enemy being less security minded when his plans are interfered with, more is given away, all of which may be of exceeding value as the campaign develops. Considerable pressure would have to be exercised on the branch responsible for loading tables, but the advantages of a complete Y unit to the formation commander are such that the highest priority for its inclusion entire should be obtainable.

22. After Landing.

a. Assignment.

As 5 Corps did not land in the first follow up, the Corps Y unit (B-type Section) was attached to 78 Div H.Q. This arrangement worked extremely well, and the smallness of the Div I Staff was compensated by one of the I.O.'s of the Section estimating the value of Y intelligence in terms of I(a). Whenever the same problem arises, it is recommended that the Corps B-type Section be attached to the senior Division acting in quasi Corps role until such time as Corps H.Q. have landed. This is preferable to keeping the unit back until Corps H.Q. have landed partly for the reasons mentioned in para. 21 and partly because no Y unit can produce intelligence the moment it sets up house. This is due to the necessity for sorting the traffic heard (since all major wireless bands are full of traffic, much of which can be heard even when the transmitter is many hundreds of miles away). The two mobile D/F trucks now part of every B-type Section have a considerable part to play in this preliminary sorting process.

b. B-type Section (1942).

The revised B-type Section (1942) is an undoubted improvement on the 1941 edition. This has only been partly evident so far, as the Section with 5 Corps is on the old establishment as regards personnel and transport but on the

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

new one as regards equipment. Had the Section been completely on the new establishment it would undoubtedly have produced more, if not better, results. The strain on too few operators coping with increased sets has resulted in a certain amount of sickness due to overkeenness on their part.

c. Communications.

The need for adequate communications facilities between all Sections of the Y Service cannot sufficiently be stressed. Y must be provided with its own W/T communications as quite apart from the need for passing intelligence (in high grade cypher) it cannot function properly unless technical information is continually passing between all its units and I(s) at higher levels. The normal Signals channels can sometimes cope with the intelligence side, rarely with the technical information which is often required in the form of "question and answer".

A further point is that communication should be authorized from the start with G.H.Q. of adjacent theater or theaters. Owing to special cyphers for Y intelligence issued to this H.Q. not being made available to G.H.Q. Middle East, much valuable assistance from Mideast in the early stages could not be received.

d. Siting of Units.

The siting of Y units provided many difficulties owing to the mountainous nature of the ground. Not until recently has a general move forward of higher formations taken place so that the problem has constantly been where to site units so that they fulfil their two main functions

- (1) of taking the traffic required.
- (2) of passing it in shortest time to the Intelligence Branch of the formation to which assigned.

The only general answer possible is that units may have to be sited near a lower formation than is customary, reporting over their own links to the higher formation to which they belong. (The alternative of a Signal Center does not work well in practice as the lines are usually overloaded no matter what priority is assigned to Y units.)

23. General.

The following points of a more general application are grouped together for convenience though not necessarily inter-related.

a. Inclusion of 'veterans'.

An immense advantage would accrue in any future operation by the inclusion of personnel from units with battle experience on the strength of new units first coming out. Experience counts more in Y work than is generally realized. A judicious interlarding with Mideast personnel in units fresh from home would have been of great value in this operation.

b. I a Training for I.O's.

Y I.O's trained in U.K. need to be more Ia minded. A detailed Order of Battle knowledge is an invaluable asset to any Y I.O. and more stress on this might be laid. It is also necessary for the Y I.O. to know what is, and is not, important to Ia so that his choice of information to pass back immediately may be right. So much of the intelligence produced by Y is 'scrappy' (due to difficulties of reception, new or only partially broken codes and the like) that the selection of the right 'straw' to indicate the wind is not always apparent. It is recommended therefore that all I.O's in Y should at some period - preferably after being Y trained - serve an attachment of some weeks duration at Ia of a formation, preferably Corps or Division.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ - 8 -

c. Intelligence School.

UNCLASSIFIED

Soon after the start of any operation such as this provision should be made at G.H.Q. for a small "Intelligence School" to read all logs from Y units in the theater, to produce wireless network diagrams from them, to check call-signs, serial and row changes and generally to be responsible for the longer term W/T I. Sections in the field have little opportunity for more than short term W/T I and in times of battle practically none at all. Investigation into map reference systems, code systems, and the like cannot be undertaken locally but must be done centrally. This is a very real need and should be catered for in any future operation. This party should normally arrive simultaneously with the Army A-type Section.

d. Pool of Reinforcements.

An adequate pool of reinforcements should be drawn up and included in all future operations. In this theater only two W/T I Other Ranks were provided and were absorbed soon after landing leaving no reinforcements whatsoever. On the Signals side the scale is also too low and requires reconsideration. Any loss of personnel through enemy action or sickness is immediately reflected in the operational output of the unit. The ideal solution would be the despatch of one complete B-type Section over and above those assigned to Corps. This unit could then relieve Corps Sections in rotation either in whole or in part and provide all grades of reinforcements as required.

e. American Y Units.

All the above remarks have been confined to British units as the participation of complete American units in this theater has not yet materialized. The American Section with British W/T I personnel has acquitted itself well in spite of many handicaps due to faults inherent in the general organization of American field Y units. This subject is one however which needs to be investigated at a higher level and a joint American-British Committee might well at some later stage be charged with examining the problem in the light of British experience and American difficulties.

24. Conclusion.

In the main the plans made, the training of the units and the results achieved have been entirely satisfactory. The improvements suggested above are chiefly concerned with detail and should without undue difficulty be capable of realization.

25. I.S. Staff at Army H.Q.

It is considered that only one I(s) Staff Officer is needed at Army H.Q. until the arrival of the A-type Section.

26. Water Trailer for A-type Special Wireless Section.

A-type Special Wireless Section has a strength of 154 all ranks and only sixteen 2-gallon containers to hold drinking water. For technical reasons, the section is often sited in remote areas where the problem of obtaining drinking water is great.

It is considered that a water trailer is essential for the section.

D. SECURITY.

27. Security Before the Operation.

a. Looking back at the daily routine of planning and at the various incidents that occurred during that period, the absolute necessity for strictly maintaining all security safeguards as laid down during the planning stage is manifest. Security office routine; the confining of knowledge of the operation to those only whose duty makes it essential for them to be "in the know"; the classification of such individuals into one or more categories according to the

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

nature of the operation; constant supervision by security personnel that these precautionary details are carried out in the letter and the spirit; are vitally important. To effect this it is essential that a security staff officer with considerable experience should be attached to the planning staff to keep a constant watch on the security situation. To assist him in carrying out any necessary measures security personnel must be available. This latter work can be carried out most effectively by Field Security Sections. In spite of the most efficient security organization the human element intervenes and violations of security occur; personnel must therefore be available to trace such violations, discover the seriousness of the compromise, and the author, and in serious cases produce evidence through which the delinquent can be suitably dealt with. Some fifty serious cases of violation of security were investigated during the planning stage of TORCH, some so serious that Courts Martial were necessary, and the publication of their findings had considerable effect. The outstanding fact was that these indiscretions were due more to thoughtlessness than anything else and emphasized that security must be made a habit. The organization in London by which lost despatch cases or documents could be rapidly traced was invaluable and may possibly have prevented the failure of the operation.

From the above it will be realized that no changes in our security routine during the planning stage are recommended, but the necessity for constant watchfulness and personnel for security supervision is stressed.

b. With regard to security and the troops, no new lessons appear but the benefit of some three years security training was apparent. Censorship and other tests showed that on the whole security was good. It is not necessary for troops to be given any details of projected operations. They are well aware from their special training that they are shortly going on an expedition but most of them are content to leave it at that. Great care must be exercised that the date of embarkation is concealed from them to the last moment. The wildest rumors will inevitably arise, but these are so varied that they are of little importance. If considered advisable a false destination can be allowed to leak out.

c. It is considered that the value of subversive activities on our part in the theater of the projected operation should be carefully weighed against the very considerable security risk entailed in allowing individuals operating in the theater to be in possession of details of the projected operation. In Operation TORCH the French Securite Militaire owing to our covert organizations' activities had more than a suspicion of our intentions. It was fortunate that this French service had at its head individuals who were sufficiently Pro-Allied in sentiment to see that this vital information did not reach the enemy.

28. Security on Arrival in the Theater of Operations.

a. It is realized that in landing operations the conveyance of the maximum number of fighting troops is paramount and that the arrival of personnel for security purposes must be arranged for the later stages. At the same time the usefulness of F.S.P. in searching for documents, arresting and examining suspects, preventing illicit communication, was clearly demonstrated. Where senior officers were on the spot to insist that F.S.P. were landed in good time to give effect to their duties valuable documents were seized, enemy or hostile personnel captured and the situation from the security angle was adequately controlled by F.S. personnel. Where this backing was lacking, security personnel remained in the boats and valuable opportunities were lost which did not recur.

b. The difficulties of F.S. personnel when they arrive in a new theater are very considerable. Small bodies of men, who must inevitably act on their own, are landed in a strange town. Their knowledge in most cases depends on the study of town plans and what information has been gleaned from various reports. Knowledge of the language of the country is absolutely essential and even with that their difficulties are enormous. It is urged that careful study should be given to the question of how best to utilize language qualifications. It is realized that collecting men of one language into sections must give away our intentions but at the same time there must be some solution and it is suggested that a Corps of Security Interpreters be formed by language sections so that

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

they may be available for shipment at short notice at the desired objective. The difficulties of concealing this objective should not be insurmountable once the sections are trained and formed.

c. The instruction imparted to F.S. personnel in courses arranged by G.H.Q. Home Forces in the examination of captured documents was fully justified. The importance of such documents and the necessity for any officer or soldier acquiring them handing them over immediately to those capable of dealing with them cannot be too strongly emphasized. A case occurred in TORCH of a senior Intelligence Staff Officer "sitting on" a valuable document for 14 days without forwarding it.

d. The employment of a S.I.(b) unit was tried out for the first time and fully justified itself. It is not usually possible to find General Staff Officers I(b) with an intimate knowledge of the intricate detail and delicacy of this more complicated side of counter espionage. Nor is it desirable that full knowledge of these details should be known to F.S. personnel. Therefore it is essential that a body of specially trained officers with adequate staff and transport should be available for attachment to the G.H.Q. of the Force. Such personnel should be supplied by M.I. 6, who must have adequate warning, to collect and acquaint these officers and men of the special features of the theater in which they will be called upon to operate. The S.I.(b) unit attached to A.F.H.Q. was invaluable. In addition to the normal difficulties of any overseas operation there were the additional problems of acting with completely friendly and later potentially friendly allies. In both cases their knowledge of the fundamentals as well as the details of their work was invaluable.

29. The Organization of Security in a Theater of Operations.

Security in the occupation of a theater may be roughly divided into two parts. The forward and the rear areas. In the forward zone no great difficulties occur. I(b) staffs and F.S.P. attached to the fighting formations are adequate and if thoroughly trained on normal lines may be relied on to carry out their missions. Ad hoc arrangements would no doubt have to be made to deal with special situations that arise according to circumstances, as was found in the case of the Fifth Corps in whose area difficulty was encountered with the Arab population giving information to the enemy. In this case as the number of F.S. Sections was inadequate special units were formed from a S.O.E. unit reinforced by recruits from the Corps Franc and supported by any F.S.P. available. These units by a system of patrolling, rewards for information and speedy punishment of serious hostile acts speedily improved the situation.

In the rear areas the problem is more difficult. It is almost impossible to foresee all the numerous security problems that will inevitably arise. The control of merchant seamen ashore, control of movement of the civil population, the removal of uncooperative civil officials, investigation of the cases of persons arrested in the early days of occupation, all require an organization to deal with them. Such matters are as much a question for Civil Affairs as security. In consequence, the liaison between Civil Affairs and the General Staff I(b) cannot be too close. It is recommended that a fairly senior officer should form part of the I(b) staff at G.H.Q. to carry out liaison duties with the civil side. It is also recommended that in an Allied Force the civil section attached to G.H.Q. should have equal representation of the various nations involved.

In a territory where distances are great it is impossible for the senior I(b) staff officer to supervise personally the widely scattered elements in which he is interested and who require advice and help. He must decentralise and requires fairly senior officers to help him do so. The heads of such sub-sections as Military Security, Civil Security, Port and Frontier control must be in charge of at least a G.S.O. 2, and preferably a G.S.O. 1. A more junior officer has neither the standing nor experience to deal with the matters that require his attention. They also cannot carry sufficient weight when visiting foreign authorities, ports and stations unless they have some seniority. The importance of such visits is very considerable and unless carried out uniformly and improvements gleaned by the pooling of experiences, cannot be achieved.

It will be seen from the above that few really new lessons have been obtained from operation TORCH but that the system of security training at home has been sound and that difficulties have arisen more from individual mistakes and violations of ordinary security than anything else. The necessity of continually drumming into all ranks the elements of security until they become an instinct is fully proved. The training of F.S.P for action both in the forward and rear zones has been on the right lines and should be continued.

When planning civil control of the country invaded the closest liaison between Security and Civil Affairs must be arranged for. In this connection careful thought must be given to whether cooperation between the native authorities is likely or otherwise. One of our greatest difficulties in North Africa was the lack of cooperation in the early stages from the French civil authorities. To remove those that were obstructive was difficult, to obtain actual facts against them was often impossible. It was not until a Military Commission of French judges and magistrates was formed to tour the country and investigate alleged cases of non-cooperation and subsequently to forward their findings to General Staff I(b), that non-cooperative officials could be effectively removed. This work is going on at the present moment and is bearing good fruit.

31. Civil Enquiry Office and Consulate Organization.

On arrival in the theater of operations, the I(b) office and each Field Security Section was inundated with demands for information from civilians on every conceivable subject. There were many ostensible well wishers wanting to be employed as interpreters, etc., distressed British subjects seeking repatriation and many refugees in difficulties.

It is considered that to cope with this civilian problem, Civil Affairs Branch should run an enquiry bureau and that a consulate organization should be set up as soon as possible after arrival.

32. Transport of Field Security Sections.

The transport of F.S. Sections at present consists of an 8 cwt. P.U. truck and 14 motorcycles. This transport is insufficient to carry the full G 1098 equipment of a F.S. Section.

It is considered that

- a. All motorcycles in the F.S. Section should be equipped with panniers.
- b. That the F.S. Sections should have a 15 cwt. truck instead of an 8 cwt. truck.

33. Classification of Documents.

a. The differences in classification of messages and documents between U.S. and British procedures has led to difficulties.

b. The agreed classifications were:

SECRET equals British MOST SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL equals British SECRET
RESTRICTED equals British CONFIDENTIAL

c. The present use of the classification "SECRET equals British MOST SECRET" has resulted in the debasing of the classification "MOST SECRET" owing to the fact that the measures prescribed for handling American "SECRET" are not so stringent, and also in the lowering of the classification owing to its extensive use.

d. In this theater an attempt is being made to educate personnel to restrict the use of "SECRET equals British MOST SECRET" to the subjects laid

~~SECRET~~ **UNCLASSIFIED**

down in A.C.I. 1579/1941, para. 3, and A.R. 3807 (20th Sept. 1942) Section I, para. 3 (b), and also to bring into line the procedure for handling American SECRET and British MOST SECRET material.

e. It is felt, however, that the whole question of relative British and American Army, Navy and Air Force Classifications should be taken up with a view to their standardization.

34. Vehicle Signs and Shoulder Titles.

Formations and units should arrive in the theater without vehicle signs and shoulder titles. There has been some evidence that formation moves towards the front have been traced by this means.

It is considered that Army Commanders should be empowered to replace vehicle signs and shoulder titles when considered necessary for the purpose of traffic control or morale. Generally speaking, they can, from a security point of view, be replaced sooner in Army and Corps Troop units, as these cover a wide area.

E. CENSORSHIP, PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PROPAGANDA.

35. It was found early in the campaign that Public Relations, Censorship and Propaganda developed to such an extent that it was no longer possible to handle them in the Intelligence Branch. A separate section known as "Information and Censorship" was therefore set up. It is considered that this will always be necessary where a campaign takes place in a country, the occupation of which leads to political upheaval and necessitates propaganda to the inhabitants as well as the enemy. (In North Africa, the French, Arabs, Germans and Italians.)

36. Censorship.

The Censorship Section of A.F.H.Q. was split up into four subsections which are dealt with separately below:

a. Field Press Censorship (Censorship of War Correspondents' copy, photographs and radio broadcasts.)

Due to the fact that TORCH operation was, in the early stages, split into three separate areas, it was decided to send a censor with each of the landing parties in order to censor for local security. All copy was then passed back through the Command Post where re-censorship and coordination of policy was carried out. This method was continued until the activities in Oran and Casablanca ceased and one front was established. It proved most satisfactory. After the establishment of one front it was intended that all censorship should be done at A.F.H.Q. The communications, however, were bad; and, in order to try to accelerate news, censors moved forward in small parties. This was not a satisfactory arrangement and, eventually, censors were moved back to A.F.H.Q. The lesson drawn from this experience was that censorship is best conducted at the rear headquarters where a truer perspective of events and the highest guidance is obtainable. During the period when the local political situation was always changing, no information was handed out to War Correspondents. This had the effect, at a later date, when complete freedom of comment was allowed, of making the censor's task extremely difficult. The policy was also considerably relaxed regarding reporting of military operations. Such inconsistency is to be deprecated. A firm policy should be adopted at the start and relaxation should only be made when justified by the course of events. Further difficulties were made for Field Press Censors by the fact that many Correspondents moved about freely without the supervision of a conducting officer, and as a result, wrote a great deal which had to be cut. It is most desirable that Correspondents should be conducted and that censors should be able to pass forward guidance to Public Relations, thus avoiding a great deal of unnecessary censorship and vexation to the correspondents.

CONCLUSION: In brief, lessons learnt regarding Field Press Censorship, were that censors should all work together in the rear areas and all copy emanating from the Theater of War should pass through one point, and that a

UNCLASSIFIED

form of consistent policy should be followed.

b. Postal Censorship (British Field Censorship - American Base Censorship).

In view of the shortage of shipping space it was not possible to bring postal censor sections out in the early stages of this campaign. It is suggested that censor sections should be allotted to formations not lower than division and should move as part of that division. As subsequent divisions arrive in the theater of operations the base censors would then form into one main unit established at the most convenient point of the L of C. This would enable postal censorship to be done immediately on the arrival of troops and a most useful source of information would be available to the Command Staff. It has been shown, from the results of Base Censorship, that British troops were much more security-minded than American troops. Consequently, the per cent of U.S. Base Censorship to be done is very much higher. This could be very largely rectified by frequent security lectures and by familiarising the troops with censorship rules before disembarkation.

c. Censorship of Local Press and Radio.

Personnel for this form of censorship were not provided for in the initial stages and it was decided that Psychological Warfare personnel should carry out such censorship as was necessary. This was not a success as propaganda and censorship are directly opposed and men trained to appreciate the positive value of news were blinded to the security. Numerous censorship slips were made, and, as a result, it was decided to bring out trained personnel to work under the control of the Censorship Branch. It is considered essential that an invading force should arrive equipped with an adequate staff as it is obviously desirable to carry on with the local press and not deprive the people from enjoying their usual amenities. The attitude of the local population must be counted as an important factor from the military point of view and news which is censored prevents the starting of rumors and ill feeling.

CONCLUSION: Censors for local press and radio should accompany an invading force and be considered as an essential part of a military operation.

d. Censorship of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones.

In view of the special policy adopted in this campaign of cooperation with the French Censorship it was not possible to gain very much useful information as regards other operations. It has been seen, however, now that our liaison with the French is well established, that there is a great deal of useful information to be obtained from censorship of local communications. Moreover as with the French press, it is desirable that no interruption should take place of facilities normally enjoyed by the local population. It is therefore considered that personnel for this form of censorship should arrive in the theater of operations as soon as possible after the landing. Even with a small staff it may be possible, by routing letters and telegrams through central points, to allow civilian mail to continue.

GENERAL CONCLUSION: It is thought that, in view of the two important aspects of censorship, as security and as a source of information, that greater consideration should be given to personnel required, that careful selection of officers should be made before the operation starts and that personnel should be available for moving to the theater of operations as soon as shipping space permits.

37. Public Relations.

A separate report on the working of Public Relations has already been rendered. Its main conclusions were:

a. That all Public Relations personnel, vehicles and War Correspondents come under command of the Chief Public Relations Officer.

b. That sufficient transport be assigned to the Public Relations Service prior to the commencement of operations.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

- c. That such transport be landed simultaneously with the correspondents.
- d. That the number of correspondents allotted to any sector be based on the transmission facilities available.
- e. That suitable aircraft be earmarked for the purpose of transporting press material from the forward area to the main transmission center.
- f. That there be sufficient censors to meet the need not only of the correspondents in the forward area, but those who will normally be grouped around General Headquarters.

38. Newspapers and News.

No arrangements were made beforehand to issue a newspaper to British troops. This had a bad effect on morale, especially as no mails arrived for some weeks. Formations did their best to issue local newssheets, but up to date information was difficult to obtain.

It is recommended that headquarters of Armies, Corps and Divisions should each be issued with a wireless set with which to obtain news for dissemination until such time as a central newspaper can be printed and distributed.

39. Propaganda.

It has been found essential for dealing with the Arab problem, for the closest liaison to be maintained between P.W.E. and Army or Corps H.Q. The attachment of a P.W.E. Officer to Corps, which has recently been made, is considered most necessary.

F. CLERICAL WORK AT A.F.H.Q.

40. From a clerical viewpoint, Operation TORCH was a rediscovery of the obvious. Despite the uniqueness of the organization, where two different and well established systems had to be fused in a very short space of time, into a single working unit, the outstanding lessons which emerge are those which necessarily govern any efficient office routine.

a. Prior to Embarkation.

The initial difficulties were successfully solved by:

- (1) The issue of clear and comprehensive "Standing Operating Procedure" by the Chief Clerk, which established uniform and simple procedure covering every phase of the clerical activities of G-2.
- (2) Close cooperation between British and American clerks, and between Officers and Enlisted Men generally.
- (3) Exercise of foresight in the securing of personnel in sufficient numbers to cope with the rapidly increasing volume of work.

b. In the Theater of Operations.

Several points may be emphasized during the period following the move of G-2 Section overseas.

- (1) There have been instances to demonstrate that clerical efficiency must be impeded if working room is inadequate. The care in allotting sufficient space for clerks and draftsmen must be given serious attention. It is a question of efficiency, not of comfort.
- (2) The conditions of a move overseas, calls upon the clerical strength by postings, sickness, and replacements during rest periods, all emphasize the necessity for general intelligence training for every clerk in the section.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

c. General Observations

UNCLASSIFIED

(1) Essential Characteristics of an Intelligence Section.

- (a) Speed in transmission of documents both internal and external.
- (b) Accurate recording of all documents passing through the section.
- (c) Realization by each clerk of the essential principles of SECURITY and the vital information that passes through his hands.
- (d) Correct and systematic collation of information.

(2) Organization.

(a) The section must be organized "comprehensively", i.e., the channels of communication and relations between sub-sections must pass through one "clearing house". Organization of the sub-sections without regard to the section as a whole would create lack of coordination.


(b) Clerks should be trained as far as possible to gain experience of routine outside of their own particular work. The method of registration, dispatch and filing of correspondence should be impressed on all clerks. Interchangeability is essential to meet the periods of high pressure in any one particular sub-section. Occasional "pep talks" and the issue of simple instructions by the Chief Clerk helps a great deal in keeping them in the picture and enables them to perform their duties in the correct manner.

(c) The clerks must be thoroughly trained in General Army Clerical routine, particular attention being paid to their typing qualifications. They should be impressed with the need for neatness and speed when handling correspondence.

(d) Clerks when already trained in Intelligence Clerical duties should only be absorbed into other intelligence sections. They should not be posted away to other formations outside the Intelligence sphere.

(e) An adequate supply of office machinery and stationery is essential. Particular attention should be paid to typewriters, duplicating machines and draftsmen's equipment.

d. The following chart shows the basic principle of organization of the clerical work in an Intelligence Section. It has been found by experience that this set-up allows for the maximum efficiency with the minimum number of available personnel.



UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1+

